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At some point after Maximilien Robespierre embarked on a career in revolutionary 
politics he became known as  ‘the incorruptible’. This literally meant that he was seen 
as a ‘man of virtue’. People nowadays do not use the term virtue when they talk about 
politics. Sometimes I am told this is an archaic term than the general public will no 
longer understand. Yet in the realm of contemporary politics, matters of morality and 
immorality are as topical as ever. We no longer speak about the virtue of political 
leaders, but we do speak about honesty and hypocrisy; corruption and integrity; the 
need to put the public good over cronyism and favouritism; the acceptability or 
otherwise of political ambition and careerism; and the proper demarcation between 
public and private life. For example, the recent detention for questioning of Nicolas 
Sarkozy, on 1 July 2014, following allegations about corruption during his time in 
public office, invoked some of the same issues that vexed the revolutionary 
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generation.
1
 There is a difference of course between our politicians and those of the 
French Revolution. We do not cut the heads off our politicians when they fall short of 
high moral standards. But we all know that the integrity or otherwise of politicians has 
an impact on many peoples’ lives. 
We do not, however, expect our politicians to be heroes. We know that being 
in politics entails, in the words of Hilary Clinton, making “hard choices”.2 We might 
well agree with Charles Nodier who, in 1831, characterized the professional politician 
in sceptical, but realistic, terms as pursuing a “Career of ambition, of egoism”.3 But the 
generation before that of Nodier, the generation that made the French Revolution, took 
a much more idealistic view. They learned later to be cynical – largely as a 
consequence of their experience of revolutionary politics. The French revolutionaries 
are sometimes seen as naïve, but they were far from being fools. Their conception of 
politics was framed very consciously as a reaction against the cynicism and corruption 
that characterized the politics of the old regime, and needs to be understood against that 
backdrop. The French revolutionaries were the first generation to engage in the new 
cultural world of democratic politics, where politics was played out before the gaze of 
public opinion. They were inexperienced and improvised as they went along. They 
thought politicians had a responsibility to put the public good first, that they should be 
heroes. But what kind of heroes did the new world of revolutionary politics require?  
I come to the subject of political heroism out of writing my latest book, 
Choosing Terror.
4
 This was a study of the politics of successive Jacobin leaders 
between 1789 and 1794. Some people have said of my book that there are no heroes in 
it, but I do not see it like that. It is true that that the revolutionary leaders had all too 
human frailties, but I found many well-intentioned men – and a few women – who 
passionately believed in creating a better world. They experienced difficult 
circumstances, in the course of which they made hard choices (in Clinton’s words). 
Some of those choices were truly ‘terrible’ in their consequences, yet the revolutionary 
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leaders were far from being immune to those consequences. The French Revolution 
was many things and impacted on many lives: for many of the revolutionary leaders it 
was a personal tragedy, as some became the victims, as well as the perpetrators, of 
revolutionary terror. 
Here I am going to focus on ideas about political heroism during the early 
period of the Convention and the height of the Republic, from the summer of 1793 to 
the summer of 1794. I want to investigate how the men who dominated politics thought 
about their role as political leaders, how they understood that role, and what kind of 
dilemmas it presented. Several of my examples are drawn from Robespierre and 
especially Saint-Just, partly because both men had strong ideas about what it meant to 
be a man of virtue, but also because I am currently writing a book about these two 
revolutionaries, along with Desmoulins and Danton.
5
 
To some extent heroism is a cultural construction – that is, a social group 
designates certain individuals as having heroic status according to the needs of that 
group. The concept of heroism was integral to the political culture of the Revolution.
6
 
The Republic required different kinds of heroes. Revolutionary soldiers were supposed 
to show heroism, in the form of courage, discipline and commitment to the patrie. But 
politicians were also supposed to show heroism – albeit of a particular kind.  
Several historians have considered themes of heroism in revolutionary 
political culture, including Annie Jourdan and Thomas Crow.
7
 One of the fundamental 
questions about political heroism was - can a politician be allowed to be a hero before 
he is dead? Does a living politician who acquires the status of ‘hero’ become 
dangerously powerful as a consequence? The French revolutionaries thought so. Their 
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fears were confirmed by the ‘unmasking’ of some of the early leaders of the 
Revolution, including Lafayette and Mirabeau. So, by the time the Convention met, the 
Revolution’s political heroes were invariably dead ones. Yet the reputations of dead 
political leaders who were attained the status of heroes could also be appropriated by 
living ones. As an example of this process, the appropriation of the dead Marat as a 
revolutionary hero has been the subject of some fascinating studies, including those by 
Ian Germani, Jean-Claude Bonnet, and, most recently, Guillaume Mazeau.
8
 
Whilst I am much indebted to these and other studies, I want to take a slightly 
different angle here, by focusing not so much on how the images of dead 
revolutionaries were appropriated after their deaths, as on how the idea of revolutionary 
heroism impacted on living revolutionaries. I want to look at how these ideas served, 
not only as a model for their conduct but also as a source of anxiety, presenting them 
with dilemmas, and entailing more of those ‘hard choices’. I am especially concerned 
with how revolutionary leaders shaped their own identities within the constraints 
imposed by these models of heroism. By exploring how revolutionary leaders viewed 
political heroism I think we can throw some light on both the experience of revolution, 
and its emotional history. 
Since the French revolutionary leaders were entrusted with political power in a 
regime of popular sovereignty, their conduct and motivation, as guardians of that 
power, were subject to close scrutiny by public opinion. Revolutionary politicians 
also kept a watchful eye on one another; they frequently criticized or even denounced 
one another’s conduct. Two models of heroic behaviour were particularly significant 
for political leaders: the man of virtue, and the man of glory. These models had a 
history that stretched back into the old regime and beyond to classical antiquity.
9
 
There were some parallels between these two models in terms of courage, and 
public service. Yet there were also important differences, and the key one was 
motivation. Virtue was about abnegation of self. It meant literally to put the good of 
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all before one’s own self-interest. Glory, on the other hand, entailed a heightened 
sense of self. Thus, a virtuous act needed no praise from an audience to give it value; 
whereas glory was about renown, reputation and the praise of others.  
The Latin word Virtus meant literally that quality which befits a man. Virtus 
was associated with the ethos of an elite warrior caste, from which originated the idea 
of stoical virtue, as the heroic fortitude with which an individual hero could withstand 
the blows of adversity. As a quality denoting strength, martial prowess and valour, 
virtue in early modern France retained an association with this original warrior ethic. 
In the early part of the eighteenth century virtue was still regularly associated with the 
idea of the nobility as a military elite, motivated simultaneously by virtue and by love 
of glory. Virtue was also a key term in classical republican thought, at whose heart 
was the egalitarian ideal of the citizen, devoted to the public good.
 10
 The tensions 
between these two meanings  - virtue as elite warrior courage and virtue as egalitarian 
civic morality would play a significant role in ideas about heroism in the Revolution. 
By the mid-eighteenth century the association between virtue and nobility had 
weakened. There were a number of reasons for this, but one of the most significant 
changes was the increasingly outspoken criticism of the values behind court politics. 
The court was seen as the locus of personal ambition: the place where leading nobles 
congregated to further their individual and family interests through access to 
monarchical patronage. The pursuit of personal ambition and personal glory, honours 
and advancement were intrinsic to life at court. Courtiers were characterized in 
negative terms, as corrupt and self-serving: they were depicted as the antithesis of the 
man of virtue. 
With the rise of classical republican ideas, in part through the influence of 
Montesquieu, the language of virtue became a means whereby commentators could 
criticize the excesses of politics in a monarchical regime.
11
 Yet virtue had some 
extreme implications. According to the classical tradition a man who wished to be 
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truly virtuous was obliged to make a choice. His duty was to put the public good – the 
good of all people in the republic – before the good of the people who were 
personally dear to him, his own self, his family and friends. Ultimately this might 
mean that a man should be prepared to sacrifice his own life for the public good, or 
even (and worse still perhaps) the lives of those who were personally dear to him, his 
family or friends. Montesquieu defined political virtue as, “a renunciation of oneself, 
which is always a very painful thing”.12 This was the dual nature of political virtue: 
both “divine”– and “terrible”. Montesquieu described this “terrible” aspect of political 
virtue: 
It was an overriding love for the patrie which, passing the bounds of ordinary 
rules about crimes and virtues, followed only its own voice, and made no 
distinctions between citizens, friends, philanthropists or fathers: virtue seemed 
to forget itself in order to surpass itself; and an action that one could not at first 
sight approve of, because it seemed so terrible, virtue made one admire as 
divine.
13
 
The French revolutionaries considered Brutus to be the epitome of political virtue. 
This could be Marcus Brutus, but more often they meant Lucius Junius Brutus.
14
 
Whilst serving as consul, Lucius Junius Brutus had condemned his own sons to death 
for conspiring to overthrow the republic. 
 
In Jacques-Louis David’s painting, ‘The 
Lictors Bring to Brutus the Bodies of his Sons’ (1789) David gave a visual form to 
political virtue [Figure 1]. The painting is divided into two halves.
15
 The mother and 
sisters of the dead young men are bathed in light as they mourn openly. Brutus 
himself remains in shadow, his back to their bodies. The statue of Rome is behind 
him. Some of the commentators on this painting see Brutus as the embodiment of 
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cold, unflinching virtue, but the reality is more complex. It is a painting of intense 
emotion and inner conflict. Brutus’s face shows that he is suffering. His hand, 
clenched on the letter from his sons to Tarquin (the evidence of the conspiracy), 
shows his agony. So do his feet, which are twisted in an unnatural way. His whole 
body is contorted. His top half conveys the man of virtue; his lower body the price 
that is paid for virtue – paid in grief. Van Halem, who visited David’s studio in 1790 
and saw the painting, commented on Brutus’s emotion: “He swallows his suffering, 
convulsive movements shake him even to his extremities, and his feet are twisting … 
And moreover the spectator ought not to doubt for a moment that the wretched one 
suffers because he is aware of a bad action”.16 
As David well knew, in ancient Rome bodies were taken outside the city for 
burial. The principal sources, Livy and Plutarch showed Brutus in public, not in his 
house.
17
 Yet David chose to paint Brutus in his home to make it evident that Brutus 
understands that the price of his virtue is personal devastation and perpetual grief in 
his family and private life.  
The classical republican tradition was not the only source of ideas about 
virtue. There was an alternative tradition that made a much more direct appeal to the 
emotions: this was the concept of natural virtue.
18 
Natural virtue was based on the 
notion of an inner truth: authentic emotions written on the human heart and expressed 
by means of a sensibility that found an outlet in an active concern for others. Since 
natural virtue stemmed from the heart, rather than from higher education and the dry 
text of the ancients, it was a quality, which could be found as much – or more – 
amongst the poor as amongst the rich, for the poor had not been corrupted by the 
corrosive effects of excessive wealth and self-regard.
19
 Unlike the classical republican 
tradition, which painted self-sacrifice as a harsh, sometimes agonizing, choice, natural 
virtue encouraged the idea that the sacrifice of self-interest for the benefit of others 
was a way to achieve a sublime level of happiness and fulfillment.
20
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There was, however, an underlying tension about the authenticity of virtue. 
Might the assumption of virtue be no more than vice disguised as virtue? The answer 
to this problem depended on one’s view of human nature. The Jansenist theologians, 
Nicole and Esprit had regarded virtue with deep suspicion, seeing it as a manifestation 
of pride (amour-propre) and self-interest.
21
 According to this perspective, people 
portrayed their actions as virtuous, both because they wanted others to think of them 
as morally good, and also because they themselves also benefited in some tangible 
way. It was impossible to know for sure whether a man possessed genuine integrity, 
or was just faking it. This was particularly the case for people who took on a role in 
public life and who wore a mask of virtue, because it was in their self-interest to do 
so. Thus the question of the authenticity of a person’s virtue was already 
acknowledged to be deeply problematic, long before the Revolution made it a matter 
of life of death.
22
  
When we look at the sources for how revolutionary leaders thought about 
virtue, and their rejection of personal glory, we should bear in mind the Jansenist 
theologians’ doubts about the existence of authentic virtue. Our problem is the same 
that it was for people at the time of the Revolution. How can we judge the veracity of 
of someone who said that he was motivated by his love of virtue? Was it not likely 
that he was deliberately assuming a ‘mask of virtue’ – for very understandable 
reasons? A lot of this is unknowable. We can look at the words people spoke; the 
images they left, but we cannot really know what was in people’s hearts. The 
difficulty - indeed the near impossibility - of distinguishing between a politician who 
was motivated by authentic virtue and one who only professed to be virtuous, was an 
integral theme in one of the most traumatic aspects of the Terror. This was what I 
have called the ‘politicians’ terror’.23 It was characterized by a series of trials of 
factions, primarily of Jacobin and former Jacobin politicians. These trials were some 
of the most ruthless carried out during the entire Terror. In many cases conviction 
hinged on unreliable evidence regarding the authenticity of the accused politicians’ 
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inner motivation. One of the most painful aspects of these trials was the way in which 
former friends and colleagues turned on one another. The Jacobin leaders were beset 
on many sides by enemies, both open and covert. But in the end perhaps the most 
dangerous and unforgiving enemies they faced were themselves. 
Under the old regime successive monarchs were routinely represented in a 
glorified way, with the trappings of power, and emphasizing wherever possible their 
achievements in the sphere of war [Figure 2]. On the other hand, images of the king’s 
ministers were rarely brought before the public in an individualized way.
24
 From the 
outset of the Revolution, its leaders consciously repudiated the paths of glory.  
Paradoxically, whilst the Revolution opened a new career path for its functionaries 
and officials, its would-be leaders were not meant to seek out the adulation of the 
crowd, or solicit votes.
25
  From 1789 onwards there was a tacit embargo against 
formally standing for election for the national representation. A true man of virtue 
was meant to wait for his countrymen to apply to him. Anyone who was seen to seek 
out public office, or to court the praises of the crowd, risked being labeled as 
‘ambitious’. Of course, revolutionary leaders courted popularity all the time, but 
because this practice was viewed as unacceptable they tried to do so discreetly, 
maneuvering behind the scenes. The very act of engaging in this kind of activity when 
it was formally frowned upon left them vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. 
Revolutionary leaders had good reason to fear allegations that they were seeking 
personal glory. To take just once instance, Robespierre’s sister, Charlotte described 
how her brother’s very public welcome by the inhabitants of Bapaume as a local hero 
on his way back to Arras after the ending of the Constituent Assembly was an 
embarrassment to him, because he knew his enemies would use it against him. He had 
begged her to speak of his arrival to no one. “However his enemies made this 
reception into a crime; they reproached him with having let himself be feted. …”26 
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The new political leaders were keen for their faces to be shown to the public. 
The extensive circulation of engravings derived from their portraits helped to 
establish their identities before a wider public than could see them in the flesh. Yet 
there were codes about how they should, or should not, be displayed visually.
 27
  In 
contrast to the kings of the old regime, revolutionary leaders were not shown on 
horseback, which would have been seen as a sign that they were trying to make 
political capital, by portraying themselves as superior.
28
 Nor did they wear insignia or 
badges of office except when dressed as deputies en mission. Portraits of deputies 
were acceptable, if they did not glorify the sitter [e.g. Figure 3]. These were often 
simple portrayals of the individual’s features, designed to show his natural virtue and 
sensibility, his hard work as an agent of the state. Portraits of deputies did not show 
them surrounded by the symbols or paraphernalia of power. Sometimes they were 
depicted speaking publicly, though not in a way that accentuated personal power or 
demagoguery [Figure 4].  In the early years of the Republic deputies were almost 
never portrayed with swords. An exception is the portrait of Jean-Baptiste Milhaud, 
représentant du peuple en mission [Figure 5]. This representation was acceptable 
because he was portrayed in his en mission regalia, with the emphasis on his official 
function rather than his personal glory. There is one portrait, by Jean-Baptiste Greuze, 
sometimes said to be of Saint-Just, which shows him with a sword. But the attribution 
is doubtful; the likelihood is that this is an image of Talleyrand’s nephew, not the 
revolutionary leader. 
 There was a particular problem in representing political leaders in stone, in the 
form of busts or full-length statues. Stone indicated permanence:  a durability that 
lasted beyond death; an identity that was no longer subject to alteration by human 
frailties and the vicissitudes of a life still being lived. Busts recalled the heroes of 
antiquity. To allow oneself to be depicted in a way that self-consciously emulated the 
‘great men’ of antiquity could be problematic. A living man who permitted himself to 
be represented in stone was understood to be fixing his reputation in the public mind, 
and thereby making a bid for political power. Early in the Revolution this was still an 
acceptable tactic, though one to be pursued cautiously. During 1790 there was a small 
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industry devoted to the manufacturing of busts of Mirabeau, many of which found 
their way into provincial Jacobin clubs. However, when evidence of Mirabeau’s 
corruption began to mount up, this helped to discredit the whole idea of busts of 
living politicians. As Brissot expressed this, ‘no statues before death.’29 
A common revolutionary practice was the ritualized destruction of busts of 
political leaders following the collapse of their reputations. Pauline Léon, a leading 
woman sans-culotte, when imprisoned and defending her conduct, listed amongst the 
actions she had taken for the revolutionary cause that: 
 
In the month of February 1791, I went with several citizens and patriots, my 
friends, to Fréron’s house, where we broke and threw out of the windows the 
bust of Lafayette, which was in the apartment.
30
 
A similar process was enacted in the ritualized treatment, first of Mirabeau and 
subsequently Marat, as their remains were first interred in the Panthéon, dedicated to 
‘great men’ of the patrie, and later ejected.31 There was considerable disquietude 
about the process of placing the remains of a man in the Panthéon in the immediate 
aftermath of his death. Considering how quickly reputations rose and fell in 
revolutionary politics this was an understandable precaution. There was consensus 
that there should be an interval between a revolutionary leader’s death and the 
decision to formally honour him, though there was some uncertainty as to how long 
that gap should be. On 10 May 1793 Danton proposed that no one “could enter the 
Panthéon until twenty years after his death”.’32 Following the decree granting the 
honours of the Panthéon to Marat, Romme asked that the decree banning the 
Panthéon “until ten years after a person’s death” be revoked. Yet Charlier opposed 
this proposal, stating that whilst he supported making an exception in the case of 
Marat, the decree should be retained as a general principle, and that  “we should 
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submit the public lives of republicans to the surveillance of opinion” before deciding 
whether to honour them.
33
 So Marat’s treatment remained an exception to the rule. 
After the declaration of war in April 1792, the risks inherent to the Republic in 
a political leader being allowed to acquire personal glory on the battlefield became a 
source of major anxiety. In ancient Rome many political leaders had also been 
military leaders. In revolutionary France this was a dangerous combination.  Between 
the summer of 1792 and the summer of 1794, a militarily beleaguered France badly 
needed effective army officers. But the revolutionary leaders suspected that much of 
the officer corps, many of whom were still from the ranks of the former nobility, 
cared more for personal glory than for public service. After the treason (as the 
revolutionaries saw it) of Lafayette, and the even more traumatic betrayal by 
Dumouriez, a key task of the deputies was to keep a watchful eye on France’s 
generals, many of whom were arrested, and several executed. 
During the height of the Republic it was actively dangerous to be seen to 
embody in one man the virtues of the political leader with the glory of the victor in 
battle. Whilst several of the deputies en mission, sent out by the Convention to 
oversee military operations, joined in the fighting at various critical junctures, their 
fighting prowess and heroism were deliberately downplayed in public accounts of 
these events. Deputies regularly invoked the Roman aristocrat, Lucius Qunctius 
Cincinnatus, whose conduct was seen as an acceptable model for combining both 
political and military power. Cincinnatus became a temporary dictator and military 
leader only because the senate called upon him to do so in a crisis. Given the 
opportunity he chose virtue over glory, and ruled for a matter of days, returning 
promptly at the earliest opportunity to his farm, the country life, and humble 
obscurity. 
During the Year II the cult of Brutus reached new heights.
34
 The decoration of 
the meeting place of the Convention reflected the importance of Brutus as a model for 
deputies to emulate. A bust of Brutus, probably modeled on the ‘Capitoline Brutus’, 
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was placed in front of the speakers on the rostrum where deputies stood to speak 
[Figure 6]. It was replaced for a few months by the bust of Marat. Around the hall 
were painted images, or bas reliefs of Brutus (along with other leading Romans, 
Cincinnatus, Camillus and Publicola, and Greeks, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Solon and 
Plato), so that as the speakers addressed the Convention there was no escape from the 
model of Brutus, and the exhortation that they too, should be men of virtue.
35
 In time 
the heroes of the classical past were joined by two of the Revolution’s own ‘political 
martyrs’, Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau and Marat.36 Both had been assassinated for the 
political beliefs. The rituals and symbolism surrounding their funerals and subsequent 
commemoration tell us much about how the Revolution envisaged its heroes.  
  
The naked body of Lepeletier, covered only in a sheet, was displayed publicly 
at the Place Vendôme, on top of the foundations where an equestrian statue to the 
glory of Louis XIV had recently stood. Lepeletier’s bust was placed next to that of 
Brutus in the Convention.
37
 Later David’s iconic paintings of the dead Marat and the 
dead Lepeletier were displayed for a time in the courtyard of the Louvre, arranged on 
sarcophagi [Figures 7 and 8]. The embargo against visual depictions of political 
leaders which might glorify them did not apply to a dead revolutionary who was in no 
position to capitalize on the public praise now heaped upon him. Deputies were told 
that they should envy Lepeletier and Marat for achieving “so glorious an end”.38 On 
the other hand, there was potentially much to be gained by living political leaders who 
could appropriate Marat’s posthumous reputation. For this reason, Robespierre, 
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Danton and several other Jacobins were reluctant to use the term ‘glory’ with respect 
to Marat.
39
  
On 14
 
November 1793 (24 Brumaire, an II), David presented his painting of 
the dead Marat to the Convention, where it joined that of Lepeletier.
40
 The paintings 
were hung in the Convention, on either side of the president’s rostrum, Marat to the 
viewer’s left, Lepeletier to the viewer’s right.41 David addressed the Convention on 
the effect he intended his art to have upon the viewer, “…it is by making on the mind 
a profound impression, similar to reality. It is thus that the traits of heroism, of civic 
virtues offered to the regard of the people will electrify its soul…”42 The deputies 
would look upon the representations of the butchered deputies and understand that 
their own flesh was equally vulnerable: this could be their own fate:  
It is to you, my colleagues, that I offer the homage of my brushes; your gaze, 
passing over Marat’s livid and blood-stained features, will remind you of his 
virtues, which must never cease to be your own.
43
 
The message was clear: the blades of assassins were close at hand, and virtuous 
politicians must be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the patrie. The paintings were 
intended to inspire the deputies with thoughts of heroic virtue, but the daily sight of 
them may also have helped to make the deputies anxious and uneasy, though this fear 
was unacknowledged – because true virtue was meant to be fearless - or sublimated 
into rhetoric about the devotion to the patrie. In addition, both these paintings 
demonstrated to the deputies that as public officials they were obliged to be readily 
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accessible to the public, and therefore run the risk that someone would seize an 
opportunity to kill them.
44
  
 It was formally decreed that David’s paintings could never be removed from 
the hall of the Convention. But times changed, and the Revolution’s heroes changed 
too. The paintings were removed on 9 February 1795, on the grounds that they 
contravened “public order”. Some women in the galleries tried to prevent this 
happening, and to retain the erstwhile heroes in their places of honour. The women’s 
shouts were drowned out by cries of “Vive la république” and “Down with the furies 
of the guillotine”.45  
Thus the model of the man of virtue was intensely problematic for the men 
who tried to practice it. Paradoxically, there was vulnerability about the man of virtue 
that contrasted with the original derivation of the word ‘vir’ – as an intrinsically 
masculine quality. Civic virtue was potentiality at odds with many forms of 
endeavour that we might see as particularly masculine - with the warrior seeking 
personal glory on the battlefield, or with the man who was ambitious to forge a name 
for himself in the world of politics. There were tensions about the extent to which 
deputies could assume more openly aggressive models of masculinity, whilst still 
being ‘men of virtue’. 
With the deputies who served en mission, the situation was different. Here a 
more active heroism was required for civilian representatives who worked alongside 
the armies. Their principal role was to facilitate military operations, to organize 
supplies and the movement of troops. Sometimes they joined in the fighting, wielding 
swords and riding horses, though they were rarely depicted in that way, not in their 
lifetimes. The deputies en mission were relatively unprotected. Most travelled with 
only a few companions: a secretary and one or two others. They risked their lives in 
more ways than one. They could be beaten up, taken hostage, or imprisoned. Four 
died in the service of the Republic. Although there was praise of their heroism, none 
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was accorded the honours of the Panthéon.
46
 Yet misadventures and dangers were 
commonplace. Thus, Augustin Robespierre along with fellow deputy, Ricord, and 
Augustin’s sister, Charlotte, was subject to an inept ambush and a threatening 
community at Manosque. They were forced to flee for their lives up into the 
mountains; though they subsequently returned and established amicable relations with 
the local inhabitants.
47
 
Deputies en mission had the power of the Convention and its laws to back 
them, but sometimes this could only be enforced retrospectively. The most serious 
instance of this retrospective ‘justice’ occurred when Léonard Bourdon was attacked 
in Orléans on 16
 
March 1793. He escaped death. But nine men implicated in the 
attack were condemned to death by the Revolutionary Tribunal in one of the first 
instances of the legalized terror in Paris. They went to their deaths wearing the red 
shirts of parricides – for an attack on a representative of the National Convention, on 
13 July, the very day that Marat had his fatal encounter with Charlotte Corday.
48
 
Another encounter, with a happier outcome, occurred the following year. 
When Saint-Just and his colleague, Le Bas traveling en mission arrived at Saint-Pol 
on 6 Pluviôse. Despite showing their passports, they were dragged from their carriage 
and manhandled by suspicious guards. Their identity finally established, Saint-Just 
and Le Bas promptly ordered the arrest of the unfortunate members of the 
surveillance committee of Saint-Pol, though the deputies relented four days later and 
released the prisoners.
49
 
The effort of trying to maintain the identity of a man of virtue could set up 
internal conflict. Saint-Just showed signs of that inner tension. This is evident in his 
handling of the reporting of the battle of Fleurus on 26 June 1794. The French victory 
at Fleurus effectively ended the threat that the foreign powers would overrun France. 
It thus obviated the need both for the Jacobin government to remain in power, and for 
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the recourse to terror to support a campaign of military defence. Fleurus also began to 
open up the possibility of a new model of conduct for political leaders – one based on 
the military glory of charismatic individuals. Saint-Just chose to repudiate this 
possibility, continuing to model his conduct on the self-effacing example of 
Cincinnatus. He declined to make political capital out of his presence at Fleurus by 
delivering the official report on it. Instead he kept silent in the Convention and let 
Barère, his colleague on the Committee of Public Safety, make the report. According 
to Barère (admittedly a not necessarily reliable source) he had “begged  Saint-Just” to 
give the report on Fleurus, but this Saint-Just refused to do: “He was self-absorbed 
and seemed discontented”.50 The constraints of this self-abnegating role evidently 
rankled with Saint-Just. In his final speech, on 9 Thermidor, Saint-Just twice referred 
to his frustration at the way in which the public reporting of Fleurus had been 
handled: 
… It is only those who take part in the battles who win them, and it is only 
the people in power that profit from them; what we should do is praise the 
victories, and be forgetful of ourselves. ….  
They announced the victory of Fleurus, whilst others, who had been present, 
said nothing; they reported on the sieges, whilst others, who said nothing, had 
been there, in the trenches.
51
  
 
Saint-Just never got to speak these words. Within moments of him stepping up to the 
rostrum to begin his speech, he was denounced by fellow Jacobins, who used the  
language of authenticity and dissimulation, integrity and corruption: the same rhetoric 
that he himself had previously deployed to denounce other revolutionary leaders. By 
the following day both his reputation and his life had become co-lateral casualties of 
the coup that destroyed Robespierre.  
The rhetoric of heroism was not just a way of cynically manipulating others. 
Heroism could also serve as a narrative whereby revolutionaries might make sense of 
their own lives and the choices they had made. Some of Saint-Just’s most striking 
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pronouncements, which he confided to private notes meant for himself alone, may 
have been written in part to help him structure his own narrative out of the agonizing 
political circumstances in which the revolutionary leaders were embroiled in the final 
months of the Jacobin Republic. In these personal notes he could contribute to the 
shaping of his own identity by writing the conclusion to the narrative of his life – one 
in which he played the part of the hero. Everyone, after all, is the hero of his or her 
own story. Maybe he also wrote in part to give himself courage – that quality which is 
the prerequisite of any hero. In those last weeks he wrote several times about his own 
reputation and anticipated that his death would not be long in coming. He confided to 
his notebook his readiness to sacrifice himself “for the patrie”, stating that, “I have 
nothing more before my eyes than the path that separates me from my dead father and 
the steps of the Panthéon”.52 
In 1913, François-Léon Sicard created a monumental sculpture for the 
Panthéon, known as the Autel de la Convention Nationale or ‘The Republican Altar’ 
[Figure 10].  Tellingly, it was not dedicated to the glory of any one man, but to the 
deputies as a collective. The Republic is personified as a woman and stands at the 
centre. To one side are deputies swearing an oath of loyalty to the Republic: they 
include Robespierre, Danton and Desmoulins. On the other side, amongst soldiers of 
the Republic, is a deputy en mission, in military mode, on horseback – Saint-Just. It 
had taken 119 years, but they had finally achieved the public acknowledgement of a 
heroic identity, through the apotheosis of the Panthéon. 
The fall of Robespierre began a period of transition between the politics of 
virtue and the politics of glory. Both Saint-Just and Robespierre had warned of the 
possibility that the escalation of the war and the growth of the French armies might 
see the emergence of a Julius Caesar rather than a Cincinnatus. Such a man would 
base his public image not on self-effacing political virtue, but on the traditional 
military qualities of courage, leadership, and glory. A short distance from the 
Panthéon stands Les Invalides, within which rests the monumental tomb that 
commemorates just such a man: a man who did not shrink from taking power in his 
own hands. Napoleon Bonaparte proved himself not only adept at exploiting the 
language of the ‘man of virtue’ when it suited his purposes, but also, when the 
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opportunity came, prepared to seize the moment to emerge as France’s ‘man of glory’ 
[Figure 9].  
 20 
 
Figure 1 
Image credit: Jacques-Louis David, ‘The Lictors bring to Brutus the bodies of his 
sons’ (1789). 
Current Location: the Louvre, Paris. 
Source/photographer: http://www.artchive.com/artchive/D/david/brutus.jpg.html  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:David_Brutus.jpg
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Figure 2 
Image credit: Pierre Mignard, ‘Louis XIV, dressed a la Romaine, crowned by 
Victory, before a view of the town of Maestricht’ (1673). 
Current Location: the Chateau of Versailles. 
Source/photographer: 16:50, 31. Okt. 2009 Septembermorgen (Diskussion | Beiträge) 
löschte Seite Datei:Louis xiv large.jpg  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Louis_xiv_Maastricht.jpg 
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Figure 3 
Image credit: Pierre-Paul Prud’hon, ‘Portrait of Louis de Saint-Just’ (1793). 
Current Location: the Museum of Fine Arts, Lyon. 
Source/photographer: unknown.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Saint_Just.jpg 
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Figure 4 
Image credit: Jean-Louis Laneuville, ‘Portrait of Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac 
(between 1793 and 1794). 
Location: Kunstalle Bremen. 
Source/photographer: Web Gallery of Art.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jean-Louis_Laneuville_-
_Portrait_of_Bertrand_Barère_de_Vieuzac_-_WGA12443.jpg 
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Figure 5 
Image credit: School of David, ‘Portrait of Édouard-Jean-Baptise Milhaud, deputy of 
the Convention, in his uniform of Representative of the People to the Armies 
(between 1793 and 1794). 
Location: the Chateau of Vizille. 
Source/photographer: Rama.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jean-
Baptiste_Milhaud_IMG_2318.JPG 
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Figure 6 
 
Image credit: ‘Capitoline Brutus’ (Lucius Junius Brutus). 
Current Location: Capitoline Museum, Rome. 
Source/photographer: Jastrow. 3 September 2006. Capitoline Brutus Musei Capitolini 
MC1183.jpg  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Capitoline_Brutus_Musei_Capitolini_
MC1183.jpg 
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Figure 7 
Image credit: Jacques-Louis David, ‘The Death of Marat’ (1793). 
Location: Royal Museum of Fine Arts, Brussels. 
Source/photographer: Web Gallery of Art.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Death_of_Marat_by_David.jpg 
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Figure 8 
Image credit :Engraving by Anatole Desvoge, after Jacques-Louis David, ‘The last 
moments of Lepeletier’ (1793). 
Source/photographer: Charles Saunier David , Henri Laurens éditeur (1903) p. 53.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lepeletier-David_1.JPG 
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Figure 9 
Image credit : Jacques-Louis David, ‘Napoleon crossing the Alps’ (1802-3). 
Location: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. 
Source/photographer: Unknown.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:David_napoleon.jpg 
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Figure 10 
Image credit : François-Louis Sicard, ‘Autel de la Convention Nationale (1903). 
Location: the Panthéon, Paris. 
Source/photographer: Unknown.  
Public domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
URL:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Panthéon_autel_Convention_nationale
_1.JPG 
 
 
